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Abstract: This paper examines an important aspect of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) 
policy employed by regulatory agencies in the United States. How much is it worth to 
become TBTF? How much has the TBTF status added to bank shareholders’ wealth? 
Using market and accounting data during the merger boom (1991-2004) when larger 
banks greatly expanded their size through mergers and acquisitions, we find that 
banking organizations are willing to pay an added premium for mergers that will put 
them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF.  
We estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the nine merger deals that 
brought the organizations over $100 billion in total assets. These added premiums may 
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I.  Introduction and Background: 
Equitable treatment of different sizes and types of financial institutions has often been 
cited as an objective of financial regulation.  How regulators treat different types of financial 
institutions offering essentially the same financial services can influence the optimal flow of 
financial resources throughout the economy and competition among these institutions.  
However, there has been little consensus about which type of institutions receives the greatest 
regulatory benefits or, conversely, incurs the greatest regulatory cost.  One key issue in this 
debate is whether the largest U.S. banking organizations receive more favorable regulatory 
treatment than other organizations. 
In a number of areas, larger banking organizations may receive benefits unavailable to 
smaller organizations.  Many of these benefits could arise because of a perception by market 
participants that the largest U.S. banking organizations may be “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF).  
Through recent merger waves, banks have become larger and more complex and increased 
their market shares and market power.  The perception is that these institutions may have 
become TBTF.  Kane (2000) describes these giant banks as being “too-big-to-unwind” or “too-
big-to-discipline-adequately” (TBTDA).  If true, these TBTF banks may be more likely to receive 
favorable treatment by the market and by regulators during a financial crisis.   
Overall, these benefits or potential subsidies to large banks may outweigh any 
advantages held by smaller banks.  However, it is very difficult to put a price or value on some 
of these potential subsidies and come up with an aggregate measure of the benefits relative to 
those received by other banks.  The benefits of TBTF may be reflected in a number of ways – 
e.g. gaining favor with uninsured bank creditors and other market participants, operating with 
lower regulatory costs, and increasing the organization’s chances of receiving regulatory 
  2forbearance -- and these advantages could vary over time as a bank’s condition changes.  
Several studies have examined the existence of these TBTF impacts, but it remains unclear 
how much value the TBTDA aspect has added to bank shareholders’ wealth.  The value created 
by these TBTDA banks may also reflect costs borne by other investors (e.g. shareholders of 
small banks) and society at large.  Our study attempts to examine one aspect of TBTF (or 
TBTDA) – how much is it worth to become TBTF?  We believe our estimates of the possible 
subsidy to these giant banks could serve a useful purpose for future public policy discussions. 
Our study examines one potential measure of the subsidies to large bank.  If there is a 
significant value to achieving TBTF size and capturing other large bank subsidies, banking 
organizations should be willing to pay more for those acquisitions that enable them to reach 
such a size.  Moreover, if there are a limited number of suitable acquisitions that would allow an 
organization to become TBTF and if the organization has to outbid other organizations with 
similar motivations, the added acquisition premium could provide an indication of the overall 
magnitude of large bank subsidies.
1  It should be noted that this added premium could also 
imply that banking organizations see a strong benefit in reaching a threshold size large enough 
to become a key player in banking and to have control of their own fate, e.g. through increases 
in market power and political clout (see Kane, 2000).  To test the hypothesis that banks 
perceive benefits from reaching a TBTF threshold size, we use market pricing data and other 
financial data over the merger boom period 1991-2004, where a number of banking 
organizations expanded their size greatly by acquiring other organizations.   
 
                                                 
1  Another complementary market-based method for measuring large bank subsidies is an event study 
that examines how the stock of an acquiring bank fares after it announces a merger that would enable it 
to become TBTF.  This stock performance -- relative to that of organizations making non-TBTF 
acquisitions – could capture any TBTF benefits that the acquiring bank does not lose to the stockholders 
of the target through higher acquisition premiums.  The acquirer’s stock price movement would provide a 
complementary measure of large bank subsidies. 
 
  3II.  Literature Review -- Market Evidence on Potential Large Bank Subsidies: 
  The scope and the issue of TBTF have been influenced by a number of legislative and 
regulatory events.  These events have had an important role in determining the existence and 
potential size of large bank subsidies.  Among the most important of these have been the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) financial assistance to prevent the closure of 
Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), and the Federal Reserve’s intervention in 
resolving the capital shortage of Long Term Capital Management in 1998.   
In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency testified before the Congress on the bailout of 
Continental Illinois National Banks -- implying that the banking agencies did not have the means 
to close any of the 11 largest multinational banks without a significant impact on the U.S. 
financial system.  This testimony thus provided an official acknowledgement of a TBTF policy, 
while also indicated the type and size of banking organizations that might be considered TBTF.  
There have been concerns that regulatory agencies might have gone too far in protecting large 
banking organizations during the 1980-1990s bank failures, which led to Congressional passage 
of the FDICIA in 1991. 
The FDICIA sought to change how regulators could deal with failing banks and, in 
particular, with TBTF banks.  This legislation makes it more difficult for the FDIC to protect 
uninsured depositors and creditors at failing banks by requiring that bank failures be resolved in 
a manner that results in the least cost to the insurance fund.
2  However, there is an exception to 
this provision -- where a bank’s failure “would have serious adverse effects on economic 
conditions or financial stability.”
3  This exception effectively allows the FDIC to protect all 
depositors at TBTF banks (given approval from two-thirds of the FDIC Board, two-thirds of the 
                                                 
2 FDICIA also limits the time that Federal Reserve banks can provide discount window support to 
undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized institutions without becoming liable for any losses the 
FDIC would experience from the delayed closure of a failing bank.  
3 12 U.S.C. §1823 (c)(4)(G) 
  4Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and the President of the United 
States).  As a result, the FDICIA does not eliminate the TBTF protection, but creates a more 
formal and visible process for a TBTF bailout for some large U.S. banking organizations. 
Stock Market Reactions to Bank Mergers and TBTF:  Typically, finance literature has 
established that the value of target stock increases relative to the acquirer’s stock value on the 
merger announcement date.  However, unlike typical merger deals, Kane (2000) demonstrates 
that in a merger that involves very large banks -- megabank mergers – stock of a megabank 
acquirer gains value at the announcement.  These megamerger gains arise in part from 
improved access to monopoly rents and regulatory subsidies, including lower funding cost and 
increased market capitalization.
 4   Kane (2000) examines banking megamergers during the 
period 1991-1998 (after the FDICIA) and found evidence of TBTF benefits even in the post-
FDICIA period.  It is concluded that institutions engaging in megamergers hope to become so 
large or complex that they and their creditors will benefit from the FDICIA’s systemic-risk 
exception, and that the FDICIA may not be sufficient to minimize the TBTF merger incentives, 
especially with the banking industry becoming much more complex and globally involved. 
In addition, Schmid and Walter (2006) examine the value of financial conglomerates – 
whether bigger and/or broader (through scope economy) is better.  They find that, overall, the 
negative elements present in financial conglomerates outweigh the positive elements, so that 
financial conglomerates generally trade at a discount relative to specialized financial firms.  
However, they find no conglomerate discount, but a significant positive premium, for firms with 
total assets larger than $100 billion.  They conclude that the TBTF perception exists.  
Bond Market Reactions to Bank Mergers and TBTF:  Penas and Unal (2004) examine 
changes in adjusted bond returns at acquiring and target banking organizations in response to 
                                                 
4    Megamerger is defined as a merger involving one of the twelve largest banks that increases 
the size of the merged organization by at least half the amount of assets or market capitalization 
As of 1998, these banks were Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Nations, J.P. Morgan, Bank America, First 
Union, Bankers Trust, Bank One, First Chicago NBD, Fleet, Wells Fargo, and Norwest. 
  5their merger announcements during the period 1991-1998 time period.  They also compare 
credit spreads (difference between the bond yield at issue and the yield on comparable U.S. 
Treasury securities) on bonds issued before and after the merger.  They find little change in 
either bond returns or credit spreads when the acquiring banks are either small or already TBTF 
(with assets at least 2% of the banking industry).  However, when banks between these size 
ranges acquire another bank, they find that existing bondholders benefit from increased returns 
and that credit spreads decline significantly after the merger.  They attribute this result to the 
benefits banks derive from reaching or getting closer to the TBTF status and from attaining a 
higher degree of diversification.  These results thus provide evidence that bondholders attach a 
value to banks becoming TBTF through mergers. 
The Continental Illinois Evidence of TBTF:   Using an event study methodology, O’Hara 
and Shaw (1990) investigate the effects of the Comptroller of the Currency’s 1984 
announcement that some banks were TBTF.  They find that banks deemed to be TBTF 
experienced a statistically significant positive average abnormal return of 1.3 percent on the day 
the Comptroller’s announcement was made, with the highest returns to the riskiest and very 
largest banks.  In contrast, banks not regarded as TBTF had median returns of -0.22 percent 
that day, and the banks that were hurt the most were those just under the TBTF cutoff.  These 
results thus suggest that becoming TBTF is valued by market participants and carries a wealth 
effect reflective of this favored treatment. 
In addition, Morgan and Stiroh (2005) find that the naming of the TBTF banks by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 1984 elevated the bond ratings of those 
banking organizations (holding companies) about one notch compared to non-TBTF 
organizations, with subordinated note investors showing even more optimism than the rating 
agencies about future support for TBTF banks.  Morgan and Stiroh further discover that this 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  6spread and rating relationship continues in the 1990s, suggesting that FDICIA had little effect on 
how debtholders perceive the possibility of support for TBTF banks.
5   
  Other Related Studies:   Brickley and James (1986) analyze how access to deposit 
insurance affects the common stock returns of financial institutions during a period of financial 
distress, using S&L data from 1976 to 1983 (pre-FDICIA period).  They find that stock returns 
for financially distressed S&Ls were less sensitive to market movements than other S&Ls – 
weaker S&Ls, in fact, responded to modifications in FSLIC closure policy as if deposit insurance 
is a valuable subsidy. 
Rime (2005) examines the effect of TBTF on credit ratings, using a sample of large and 
small banks ($1 billion to $1.1 trillion) in 21 industrialized countries during the period 1999-2003.  
Moody’s and Fitch assign two types of ratings to banks – with and without consideration of other 
external factors (including a possible external or federal support) that would influence the bank’s 
capacity to repay its debt.  Rime finds that the TBTF status of a bank (proxied by size and 
market share) has a significant, positive impact on the bank’s credit rating – controlling for all 
the other external factors such as explicit state guarantee, etc.  The largest banks in the sample 
get a rating “bonus” of several notches for being TBTF. 
  Evidence Against TBTF:  While several recent studies have found evidence of TBTF 
even after the FDICIA, a few studies found no evidence of TBTF.  For example, Angbazo and 
Saunders (1997) find that the systematic risk estimate for large banks declined after FDICIA 
was passed, presumably in part because of the new incentives FDICIA gave uninsured 
depositors to monitor banks more closely.  Flannery and Soresco (1996) examine market 
                                                 
5 The rating agencies even acknowledge that they continue to consider a bank’s TBTF status when 
issuing their ratings.  According to Moody’s, “Institutional support, that is the likelihood that in case of 
need banks will get help from the public sector (central governments, regional governments, etc.), is a 
factor taken into account in the analytical mix underpinning banks’ debt and deposit ratings ..... it is very 
likely that governments in developed markets, having both the capacity and the willingness to act, will 
continue to offer support to the country’s largest financial institutions.” (Moody’s Investors Service – 
Global Credit Research, Rating Methodology (An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets), 
April 1999).  
  7discipline in the subordinated debt market for banks in the pre- and post-FDICIA period, and find 
some evidence of stronger market discipline (thus little or no TBTF effect) in the post-FDICIA 
period.   Ennis and Malek (2005) revisited the empirical relationship between bank performance 
and asset size – reexamining the emergence of TBTF found by Boyd and Gertler (1994) – using 
the data from 1991 to 2003.  They find no evidence of TBTF evidence in this post-FDICIA 
period.   
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) examine the prices that acquirers are willing to bid to 
acquire target banks during the period 1980-1989, and find little evidence of a TBTF-subsidy-
enhancing motive.  They conclude that most of mergers in the 1980s were motivated by 
earnings diversification – rather than an attempt to exploit the FDIC insurance subsidy.   
Our Objectives and Findings:  While the TBTF evidence has so far been inconclusive 
(depending on the data, time period, research methodology, etc.), the cost of TBTF distortions 
could be large.
6   The objective of our paper is to shed some light on the perceived TBTF 
threshold size and the magnitude of the TBTF subsidy.  Following the basic model used in 
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), we re-specify the model to incorporate the variables 
designed to capture TBTF benefits.   In other words, we include additional variables that would 
separate out the TBTF effects that may have been embedded in other factors in their model, 
such as the market to book value variables.  Interestingly, we find evidence consistent with our 
TBTF subsidy hypothesis, even with more recent data in the post-FDICIA period.   
The next section develops an empirical model for measuring the potential TBTF 
subsidies.  Section IV discusses the empirical results.  The conclusions and policy implications 
are presented in Section V. 
 
                                                 
6  See Stern and Feldman (2004) and Mishkin (2005) for the various policy measures currently being 
discussed for reducing potential distortions induced by TBTF. 
  8III.  The Data and Research Framework: 
Our analysis looks at the purchase premiums (offer price at an announcement date 
minus market price prior to the announcement date) that acquiring banking organizations are 
willing to offer to buy a target organization and whether these premiums are higher when an 
acquisition enables an organization to reach a size that is commonly perceived by the market as 
being TBTF.  The analysis utilizes merger transactions among publicly-traded banking 
organizations during the period 1991-2004.  These mergers and acquisitions, along with 
information about each transaction, are obtained from the Security Data Corporation.  To be 
included in this study, both the acquiring and target banks and thrifts must be publicly-traded.  In 
all, the data set encompasses 412 merger transactions.  Additional stock price and financial 
data are derived from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, thrift 
Financial Reports, and bank holding company Y-9 Reports, including information for the thirteen 
quarters prior to the merger announcement date. 
The basic framework of this study is adapted from that of Benston, Hunter and Wall 
(1995), which examines bank mergers in the 1980s.  Their two competing hypotheses that 
determine purchase premium in bank mergers are earning diversification (risk-reducing 
strategy) vs. deposit insurance put option value maximization (risk-increasing strategy).  Our 
model relates the purchase premiums that acquiring organizations pay to whether the merged 
organizations will become large enough to reach TBTF status and capture other regulatory 
benefits.   This is in addition to the various risk factors included in Benston, Hunter, and Wall 
(1995).  To the extent that investors place a value on TBTF banking organizations, purchase 
premiums should be larger when the acquisition will help create a TBTF bank, provided 
adjustments are made for other relevant factors.
7  Conversely, purchase premiums would be 
expected to be smaller when the merged organizations are too small to become TBTF.  Thus, 
                                                 
7 This assumes that there are a limited number of appropriate targets, and that other acquiring banks are 
also interested in these targets as a means of becoming TBTF.             
  9our model will relate purchase premiums to the different merger scenarios regarding the TBTF 
status of the merging organizations, while controlling for other characteristics of the acquiring 
and target banking organizations and for other possible merger motivations.  The basic model 
takes the form of: 
Purchase Premium  =  f(TBTF status, Characteristics of the Target, Characteristics of the  
    Acquirer, Characteristics of the Merger Deal, Other Control Factors)  
    
Purchase Premiums – Purchase premiums are calculated by taking the difference 
between the announced offer price for a target organization and the market price of the target’s 
common stock before the merger announcement.  The purchase premium thus captures the 
dollar markup over a target’s pre-acquisition stock price that the acquiring organization must pay 
to acquire control of the target.  The target’s market price is obtained for three different dates: 
20, 40, and 60 business days prior to the merger announcement date.  These three different 
dates are used as a means of capturing the most current market valuation of the target, while 
acknowledging that many mergers may be anticipated or become known to investors before the 
announcement date.
8  A comparison of the regression results for the three intervals will provide 
some indication of which interval (20, 40, or 60 days) best captures the “true” purchase premium 
(PREM_20, PREM_40, or PREM_60) for the target organization.  Following Benston, Hunter, 
and Wall (1995)’s model, the purchase premiums (in $ million) are computed as purchase price 
less pre-consolidation market value.  Table 1 summarizes how these purchase premiums, TBTF 
variables, and all of the control variables are calculated or defined.    
Merger Scenarios – Bank mergers in the data set can be divided into four categories, 
with the fourth category (both the acquirer and the target too small to create a TBTF bank 
through merging) serving as the base to which we compare the other merger possibilities.  
These categories are: 
  10Category 1 – Both the acquiring bank and the target bank are not TBTF in the pre-
merger period, but after the merger their combined assets will reach or exceed the TBTF size 
threshold.  In this case, the hypothesis would be that the acquiring organization would be willing 
to pay a higher purchase premium, given the potential benefits that would accrue to becoming 
TBTF and to capturing other large bank advantages.
9  We construct an indicator variable 
(D_Become_TBTF) to capture this hypothesized relationship, and this variable takes on a value 
of “1” for each merger that creates a new TBTF organization and “0” for all other mergers.  A 
positive coefficient would be expected for D_Become_TBTF if organizations are willing to pay 
more to capture the benefits of TBTF.   
Category 2 – The acquiring bank is already TBTF before the merger takes place, while 
the target bank is not TBTF.  In this case, the acquiring bank has previously captured the 
benefits of being TBTF, and the merger would not add the same value as in Case 1.  In some 
cases, target bank stockholders and management might even be willing to accept somewhat 
lower premiums compared to other merger possibilities, particularly if they will be continuing 
their role in the merged organization and will receive long-run benefits from being part of a 
TBTF organization.  We use the indicator variable, D_Acquirer_TBTF, to represent this case, 
and this variable takes on the value of “1” when the acquirer is TBTF, but the target is not, and 
“0” otherwise.  When compared to the base case, this variable would be expected to have a 
coefficient that is near 0 or possibly negative (as the target may be willing to accept a smaller 
premium or a discount in order to become TBTF after the merger).   
In addition, we also construct another variable (D_Acquirer_TBTF * TA_TGT), which is a 
cross product of the indicator variable D_Acquirer_TBTF and the target’s asset size.  Since the 
acquirer, although already TBTF prior to the merger, would further benefit from the potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 For more about market anticipation of bank mergers, see Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001). 
9 The shareholders of the target organization could also experience a gain from becoming TBTF if they 
become part of the new organization.  However, we hypothesize that these stockholders are fully aware 
  11TBTF subsidy as its deposit base expands, the acquirer may be willing to pay more for the 
target with larger deposit or asset base.  Thus, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be 
positive. 
Category 3 – This category is for mega-mergers where both the acquirer and the target 
are already TBTF before they merge.  Consequently, neither organization is likely to capture 
significant additional regulatory benefits, thus, the coefficient of this indicator variable would be 
expected to be near zero.  This variable, D_Both_TBTF, is defined as taking on the value of “1” 
when both the acquirer and the target are already TBTF prior to the merger.   
In this case, while the acquirers are already TBTF, there may still be an incentive to 
further maximize the value of deposit insurance put option by acquiring a TBTF target whose 
returns are highly correlated with theirs.  This impact on the purchase premium is captured by 
an interactive variable D_Both_TBTF * COV, which is a product of D_Both_TBTF and 
COV_TGT_ACQ.  In addition, the TBTF acquirer may also be willing to pay a larger purchase 
premium to acquire a TBTF target with larger deposit base.  This impact is captured by a 
variable D_Both_TBTF * TA_TGT, which is a cross product of the indicator variable 
D_Both_TBTF and the target’s asset size. 
Category 4 – Mergers assigned to this category are those where the acquirer and the 
target are too small to create a TBTF bank after their merger, and this case provides the base or 
the omitted variable to which the other merger categories will be compared. 
Definition of TBTF – Before we can assign values to the indicator variables described 
above, a definition or size threshold for TBTF status must be specified.  Selecting this TBTF 
size threshold is a conceptual matter.  TBTF is not specified anywhere by law or regulatory 
policy, but instead depends on the judgments of regulators about which banks would be a threat 
                                                                                                                                                             
of their value to the acquirer and other organizations nearing TBTF status and know that their stock can 
command a higher premium. 
  12to financial stability if they were to encounter problems.  In addition, market perceptions of TBTF 
may change over time. 
An initial guide to defining TBTF comes from 1984, when the Comptroller of the 
Currency implied that 11 large multinational banks were TBTF.
10  Since then, a number of these 
banks have disappeared through mergers with the other TBTF banks, thus leaving a smaller 
population now of the “original” TBTF banks.  However, with rapid banking consolidation, a 
significant number of other banks have reached fairly high size thresholds, and a number of 
these banks might now be judged as TBTF by market participants.  Since TBTF is not officially 
defined, there is no way to know with certainty what size of banking organization might be 
regarded by regulators as being TBTF.  However, the market (including investors and uninsured 
depositors) form their own perceptions and these perceptions are reflected in the prices of 
securities issued by the banks.  Interestingly, O’Hara and Shaw (1990) found that the policy to 
which the market reacted to after the OCC’s announcement in 1984 was that suggested by the 
Wall Street Journal, and NOT that actually intended by the Comptroller of the Currency.   
O’Hara and Shaw (1990) thus demonstrate that market perceptions of TBTF will 
influence firm values, even when those perceptions are in fact not correct.  It is important to 
point this out since nobody really knows what the correct threshold size is for banks to become 
TBTF.  One of our objectives is to estimate a perceived TBTF threshold size in this study based 
on the observed behavior of market participants during bank mergers.  In this study, we 
examine several different definitions for a TBTF size threshold.  We find that $100 billion in total 
assets, $20 billion in market capitalization, and being the largest 11 banks in the U.S. have been 
perceived by the market as important criteria for becoming TBTF.  In addition, we find that the 
market participants seem to believe that the TBTF subsidy would gradually increase further as 
the TBTF banks continue to expand their asset base.  
  13Other TBTF definitions we have examined include the various asset sizes and the 
various market capitalization thresholds – both unadjusted and adjusted for inflation.  As would 
be expected, a handful of organizations shift between the various merger categories, depending 
on which TBTF size threshold is used.  Appendix I lists the acquirers and targets in each of the 
three TBTF cases when the $100 billion dollar asset size threshold is used to define TBTF 
organizations.   Appendix II presents the number of banks in each TBTF category when using 
the different TBTF threshold definitions.   
The results presented in this paper are for the following TBTF definitions: 1)  Based on 
asset size of the organization -- $100 billion in total assets;  2)  Based on the asset size of the 
11
th largest banking organization in each year;  3)  Based on market value of equity of the 
organization -- $ 20 billion in market capitalization.  Note that the $100 billion threshold used in 
this paper also provides a good dividing line for separating organizations with a national scope 
from regional organizations.  Overall, we find that banking organizations seem to be willing to 
pay extra premiums in order to reach these TBTF thresholds.  This may be due to the various 
benefits that derive from being TBTF, other regulatory benefits associated with size, or the 
banking organization’s ability to better compete in the domestic and global market.   
Control Variables – Acquisition purchase premiums could be influenced by a variety of 
factors other than whether the combined organization will become TBTF.  These factors include 
the characteristics of the target and acquiring organizations and the nature of the acquisition 
itself. We follow the variables and the model used in Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) for the 
basic model shown in equation (1).  In addition to those variables included in their analysis, our 
basic model also includes a set of year indicator variables D_1991- D_2003,  with 2004 serving 
as the base for comparison or the omitted variable.  These year indicator variables are 
                                                                                                                                                             
10  Even the Comptroller’s statement led to a lot of confusion, since some took this to mean just the 11 
largest national banks, others thought it meant the 11 largest banks in the country – with either state or 
national charters, and others interpreted this to mean any bank larger than the 11
th largest national bank. 
  14introduced to capture the general economic conditions in each year and any other trends where 
a merger might lead to higher purchase premiums.    
Another consideration in an acquisition is whether it is an instate or an interstate 
acquisition.  While interstate acquisitions provide a chance to enter new markets and to achieve 
greater geographic diversification, instate deals may increase market power and allow greater 
cost savings through the consolidation of operations and closing of duplicate offices.  To test for 
these possible effects, we define an indicator variable (D_INSTATE) that takes on the value of 
“1” if the target and the acquirer have their headquarters in the same state and “0” if they do not.  
We also include an indicator variable that flags the mergers of equal deals (D_MOE) to capture 
the impact on the purchase premiums when the target and the acquirers are similar in terms of 
asset size.  In a merger of equals, the target and acquirer tend to have similar bargaining 
powers and would likely be willing to exchange shares roughly in relation to their current market 
prices.  The offer price over the prior market value would likely be much smaller than other 
types of acquisitions, thus a negative coefficient for this variable would be expected. 
The empirical specification takes the following form: 
  
PREM (20,40,60)  = a + b1 (VAR_ROA_TGT) (TA_TGT) +   b2 (MKT_BOOK_TGT) (TA_TGT)  
+   b3 (BETA_TGT)(TA_TGT) +   b4 (GROWTH_TGT)(TA_TGT) 
+   b5 (VAR_ROA_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b6 (MKT_BOOK_ACQ) (TA_TGT)  
+   b7 (BETA_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b8 (GROWTH_ACQ) (TA_TGT)  
+   b9 (BV_CAP_ASSET_ACQ) (TA_TGT) 
+   b10 (COV_TGT_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b11 (REL_SIZE_TGT_ACQ) (TA_TGT)  
+   b12 (D_INSTATE) +   b13 (D_MOE) + b14 (D_East) +   b15 (D_West)  
+   b16 (D_Southeast) +  b17 (D_1991) + b18 (D_1992) +  … b30 (D_2003)         -------------- (1) 
 
  15  Target’s Characteristics:  The attractiveness of a target organization will be related to 
relative size, earnings potential, risk of its operations, growth potential, and location.  Earnings 
variability is measured by the variance of return on assets (VAR_ROA_TGT) over the 13 
quarters previous to the merger announcement date.  We also included the market-to-book 
value ratio of the target (MKT_BOOK_TGT) as a measure of how investors view the target’s 
prospects or potential growth and the target’s actual asset growth over the last thirteen quarters 
(GROWTH_TGT).  The target’s systematic risk (BETA_TGT) is a measure of how volatile the 
target’s returns have been in the past year (i.e. 300 business days) relative to the market overall 
– a negative coefficient would be expected to reflect smaller premiums for higher risk targets.   
Acquirer’s Characteristics:  For the acquiring organization, a number of characteristics 
could influence its willingness to undertake acquisitions and the premiums it might pay.  An 
acquirer, for instance, might be willing to pay more for targets when the acquirer had higher 
levels of capital (BV_CAP_ASSET_ACQ), good control of risk (VAR_ROA_ACQ), higher asset 
growth (GROWTH_ACQ), and higher share price relative to book (MKT_BOOK_ACQ).  The 
systematic risk measure of the acquirer is also included in the analysis (BETA_ACQ).   
Target & Acquirer’s Relation:  The relative size of the target and the acquirer 
(REL_SIZE_TGT_ACQ) is included in the model to capture the potential economies of scale 
impact.  In addition, the correlation of returns of the target and the acquirer is included as a 
measure of risk impact on the combined organization.  Acquisitions that offer better 
diversification by the merged organization could elicit higher premiums.  As a result, the analysis 
includes the covariance of the return on assets for the target and acquirer (COV_TGT_ACQ) 
over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement date.   
  Regional Impact:  Following Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), we include the regional 
indicator variables (D_East, D_West, and D_Southeast, with the Midwest providing the base for 
comparison or the omitted indicator variable) to capture in which part of the U.S. a target was 
headquartered.  Targets located in faster growing regions of the country or those headquartered 
  16in key financial centers or regions would be expected to command higher purchase premiums.  
In addition, the combined target assets in the region controls for the demand pressure in the 
specific region. 
  Our objective is to examine the relationship between the purchase premium that 
acquirers are willing to pay and the potential TBTF benefits from the merger transaction.  The 
purchase premiums are regressed on the indicator variables that capture the TBTF status of 
each merger deal, controlling for the target characteristics, acquirer characteristics, and the type 
of merger – as described earlier.  Table 1 summarizes the definition and calculation of the 
dependent and independent variables.  The complete model is written in equation (2) below: 
 
PREM (20,40,60)  = a + b1 (VAR_ROA_TGT) (TA_TGT) +   b2 (MKT_BOOK_TGT) (TA_TGT)  
+   b3 (BETA_TGT)(TA_TGT) +   b4 (GROWTH_TGT)(TA_TGT) 
+   b5 (VAR_ROA_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b6 (MKT_BOOK_ACQ) (TA_TGT) 
+   b7 (BETA_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b8 (GROWTH_ACQ) (TA_TGT)  
+   b9 (BV_CAP_ASSET_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b10 (COV_TGT_ACQ) (TA_TGT)  
+   b11 (REL_SIZE_TGT_ACQ) (TA_TGT) +   b12 (D_INSTATE) +   b13 (D_MOE)  
+   b14 (D_East) +   b15 (D_West) +   b16 (D_Southeast) +  b17 (D_1991) + b18 (D_1992) + …… 
+   b30 (D_2003) +   b31 (D_Become_TBTF) +   b32 (D_Acquirer_TBTF)  
+   b33 (D_Acquirer_TBTF * TA_TGT) +   b34 (D_Both_TBTF) +   b35 (D_Both_TBTF * TA_TGT)  
+  b36 (D_Both_TBTF * COV)                                         ----------------------------------------------- (2) 
 
IV.  The Empirical Results 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the results of the regression analysis for PREM_20, 
PREM_40, and PREM_60, respectively.  All the analysis includes the same 412 merger deals in 
the sample period 1991 to 2004 (post-FDICIA period), based on three different TBTF 
thresholds.  Column 1 presents the results when using a $100 billion asset size threshold for an 
organization to reach TBTF status.  Columns 2 and 3 present the results when using asset size 
  17of the 11
th largest bank in each year and the $20 market capitalization thresholds, respectively.  
The year indicator variables (D_1991 - D_2003) are included in all columns and in all three 
tables but the coefficients are not reported here.   
The results are generally consistent across all the TBTF thresholds.  Overall, the results 
for the various TBTF variables support the hypothesis that acquiring banks are willing to pay a 
higher price for merger deals that would take them over the TBTF thresholds.  The regressions 
for purchase premiums over market as of 40-day (Table 3) and 60-day (Table 4) prior to the 
announcement seem to provide a better fit than those of 20-day premiums (Table 2) – with 
adjusted R
2 ranging from 87% to 93% -- versus the 78% to 81% for 20-day premiums.  This is 
probably due to the leakage of information about the merger transaction prior to the official 
announcement date.   
 
Are Banks Willing to Pay Significant Premiums To Become TBTF?  
Becoming TBTF:  As shown in Appendix II, there were 9, 10, and 7 mergers that allowed 
the banking organizations to reach the TBTF thresholds during 1991-2004, based on the $100 
billion asset size threshold, the OCC announcement (largest 11
th bank) threshold, and the $20 
billion market capitalization threshold, respectively.  From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients of 
D_Become_TBTF are consistently positive and significant.  The results strongly indicate that 
these organizations are willing to pay higher premiums for acquisitions that enable them to 
reach the TBTF threshold and to capture the benefits of being a large banking organization, 
controlling for other things that might impact the purchase prices.  These higher premiums are 
consistent with a TBTF subsidy from reaching the size thresholds, although they could also 
reflect other perceived benefits associated with being large. 
Acquirers Already TBTF, Target Becoming TBTF:  From Appendix II, there were 30, 33, 
and 21 mergers during 1991-2004 in this category based on the $100 billion asset size 
threshold, the OCC announcement (largest 11
th bank) threshold, and the $20 billion market 
  18capitalization threshold, respectively.  From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients of 
D_Acquirer_TBTF are consistently negative but mostly insignificant, as expected.  Some of the 
non-TBTF targets seem to be willing to accept purchase premiums below those on other types 
of transactions just for the opportunity to become part of a TBTF organization.  However, the 
coefficients of the cross product term D_Acquirer_TBTF * TA_TGT are consistently positive and 
significant.  This provides some indication that while the organizations that are already TBTF 
are not paying as much for their acquisitions compared to banking organizations that are striving 
to reach that level, the TBTF acquiring banks are willing to pay increasing purchase premiums 
according to the target’s asset size.   Larger targets allow the TBTF banks greater opportunity to 
expand their deposit base and increase the TBTF subsidy, and thus receive larger purchase 
premiums.  The net change in purchase premiums in this case depends on the combined 
effects of both the coefficient estimates.  As shown in Table 5, the net effect is an increase in 
purchase premiums based on the 30 merger cases where the acquirers were already TBTF 
(larger than $100 billion in assets) and the targets were not.   
Both Acquirers and Targets Already TBTF:  From Appendix II, 6 mergers were in this 
category based on the $100 billion asset size threshold and the $20 billion market capitalization 
threshold – and 8 mergers based on the OCC announcement (11
th largest bank) threshold – 
during 1991-2004.   From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients of the stand-alone indicator 
variable D_Both_TBTF are mixed and inconclusive.   When taking into consideration the target’s 
asset size, the coefficients of the cross product term D_Both_TBTF * TA_TGT are consistently 
insignificant.  The results suggest that TBTF acquirers have no incentive to pay excess 
premiums to acquire another TBTF banking organization in order to expand their asset base.  
From our examination of the TBTF banks’ potential motivation to increase portfolio risk to 
maximize the value of their deposit insurance put option, we find that the coefficients of the 
cross product term D_Both_TBTF * COV are consistently negative and significant, indicating 
that the purchase premiums are significantly smaller when the TBTF acquirers merge with a 
  19TBTF target whose returns are highly correlated with the acquirer’s.  These TBTF acquirers do 
not look to increase their portfolio risk.  In fact, they would be willing to pay higher purchase 
premiums to acquire a TBTF target whose returns would help increase portfolio diversification of 
the combined banking organization.  The net impact in this case depends on the combined 
impact from all three variables.  As discussed later, the net effect is a decrease in purchase 
premiums based on the 6 merger cases where both the acquirers and the targets were already 
larger than $100 billion in assets.   
 
Importance of Other Characteristics: 
Target’s Characteristics:  From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients of BETA_TGT are 
consistently negative and mostly significant in determining the 20-day and 40-day bid premiums, 
but insignificant for the 60-day premiums.  The results suggest that acquirers pay smaller 
premiums (or possibly discounts) when acquiring a systematically risky target, whose returns 
are subject to greater volatility (non-diversifiable risk) than the overall market portfolio.  
However, we find that the coefficients of VAR_ROA_TGT are consistently insignificant, 
suggesting that the target idiosyncratic risk does not matter while the systematic risk does.  The 
coefficients of COV_TGT_ACQ are mixed and insignificant (although significantly negative for 
D_Both_TBTF * COV), suggesting that the correlation between the target’s returns and the 
acquirer’s are mostly unimportant for non-TBTF banking organizations.  In other words, portfolio 
diversification is probably not the primary motivation for most merger deals.  Unlike most merger 
deals, as discussed earlier, TBTF banks seem to prefer to increase their portfolio diversification 
when merging with another TBTF banking organization (the coefficients on D_Both_TBTF * 
COV are significantly negative).  Overall, portfolio diversification is not an important factor in 
bank mergers except for the mergers between TBTF banking organizations.     
The coefficients of MKT_BOOK_TGT are mixed and mostly insignificant.  Targets with 
higher market-to-book value ratios are not perceived by the market to have a greater potential 
  20for earnings growth and be more efficient than the other target organizations.  In addition, the 
coefficients of GROWTH_TGT are consistently negative and mostly significant, suggesting that 
targets with high asset growth (in the past 13 quarters) do not command a larger purchase 
premium in the mergers in our sample.   
Acquirer Characteristics:  From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients of VAR_ROA_ACQ 
are consistently negative and significant, suggesting that less risky acquirers (better risk control 
and management) are generally more likely to offer larger purchase premiums in merger and 
acquisition transactions, given the same characteristics of the targets and the merger deals.   In 
addition, the coefficients of MKT_BOOK_ACQ are consistently positive and significant, 
consistent with the view that more efficient acquirers are willing to pay more (as their share 
prices are also highly priced) in the stock market.  These results are consistent with an 
argument that acquirers with higher management quality can benefit more from mergers and 
acquisitions.  This is also consistent with our earlier finding that the target’s return volatility (poor 
quality of risk management) is unimportant in determining the bid premium.   
The coefficients of GROWTH_ACQ are consistently negative but insignificant.  The 
coefficients of BETA_ACQ and BV_CAP_ASSET_ACQ are mixed and mostly insignificant.  The 
coefficients of are also mixed and mostly insignificant.  The results suggest that there is no 
strong relationship between the purchase premium that the acquirer is willing to offer and the 
acquirer’s systematic risk, the acquirer’s leverage ratio (capital ratio), or the acquirer’s asset 
growth.  Finally, we find that the coefficients of REL_SIZE_TGT_ACQ are positive and mostly 
significant, suggesting that the acquirers are willing to pay more to acquire targets of greater 
relative size, since such targets might provide greater opportunities for merger-related 
efficiencies.    
   Deal Characteristics:  We find that the regional variables are not significant after 
controlling for other characteristics of the targets and the acquirers.  The coefficients for 
D_Instate are negative and mostly significant, suggesting that there is no significant enhanced 
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opportunity for the acquirers to expand their out-of-state client base.  Finally, we find that the 
coefficients for D_MOE are consistently negative and significant about half of the time, 
suggesting that purchase premiums may be smaller for mergers of equal deals.  This finding is 
consistent with Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2000) and Brewer, Jackson, and 
Jagtiani (2005) in that any mergers involving two banking organizations of equal size are more 
likely to face problems in melding their cultures after the merger. 
 
What is the Estimated Dollar Value of the Potential TBTF Subsidies? 
Our empirical results suggest that banking organizations are willing to pay an added 
premium for mergers that will take them across the TBTF size thresholds.  This additional 
amount of purchase premium could provide some indication of the overall value of the benefits 
an organization will get as it becomes TBTF.  Some care, though, must be taken in interpreting 
what these added premiums mean.  A portion of these premiums could be tied to something 
other than more favorable regulatory treatment for large banks.  For instance, reaching the $100 
billion asset size threshold might mean that an organization now has a national rather than a 
regional presence and will be viewed more favorably by investors.  However, even allowing for 
this broader range of benefits, there are reasons why the added premiums might understate the 
true value of potential subsidies to these large banks. 
First, the overall benefits to large banking organizations might be expected to accrue to 
several parties other than just the stockholders of the target organization.  A substantial portion 
of the benefits, for instance, could go to the stockholders of the acquiring organization and to 
bondholders and uninsured depositors of both the target and the acquirer.  An acquiring 
organization and its stockholders are likely to have the bargaining power to retain many of the 
TBTF benefits, particularly since this organization may be able to select from a variety of 
acquisition targets or combinations of targets in reaching the desired size threshold.  To the 
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interest and a higher market price for the acquirer’s stock.  The uninsured depositors -- and 
possibly the bondholders -- of both the target and acquiring organizations would also anticipate 
receiving greater protection once they become part of a TBTF organization, and the value of this 
protection would thus be an additional benefit (not accounted for in our study).  
One other factor that could lead to our under-estimation of the TBTF benefits is that 
investors may try to anticipate which acquisition targets would provide a good stepping stone for 
organizations trying to become TBTF.  These investors may bid up the price of such targets well 
in advance of the 20-, 40-, and 60-day windows we use to capture purchase premiums, thereby 
leading to lower estimated values for the additional purchase premiums.
11  Consequently, while 
acquirers may pay greater purchase premiums to capture the expected benefits of TBTF, there 
are a number of factors that suggest these added premiums may only be a starting point or 
lower bound for estimating the overall TBTF benefits. 
Based on our estimation of equation (2) and the regression results from Tables 2, 3, and 
4, we calculate the TBTF premiums that are associated with coefficients on D_Become_TBTF, 
D_Acquirer_TBTF, D_Acquirer_TBTF * TA_TGT, D_Both_TBTF, D_Both_TBTF * TA_TGT, and 
D_Both_TBTF * COV for each of the merger deal.  The specification is described in equations 
(3), (4), and (5) below.   
Subsidy (Become_TBTF)        =  b31       -------   (3) 
Subsidy (Acquirer_Already_TBTF)      =  b32 + b33(TA_TGT)      ----    (4) 
Subsidy (Acquirer & Target_Already_TBTF) =  b34  + b35(TA_TGT) + b36(COV_TGT_ACQ) --  (5) 
 
Table 5 presents the total dollar value of the TBTF premiums for all the merger deals in 
each merger category, based on those merger deals that are associated with TBTF during 
  231991-2004.  The estimated TBTF premiums in column 1 of Table 5 are Subsidy 
(Become_TBTF) – equation (3).  The top panel is for the $100 billion asset TBTF threshold – 9 
merger deals.  The combined excess purchase premiums paid by these nine acquirers to 
become TBTF range from $14 billion (60-day window) to $16.5 billion (40-day window).    
Becoming TBTF is worth an additional over $1 billion on average for each of these nine 
acquiring organizations.  Our estimated TBTF premiums account for 46 percent (60-day 
window) to 71 percent (20-day window) of the total purchase premiums that the nine acquiring 
banks actually paid.   The middle and the lower panels report the TBTF premiums for the other 
TBTF thresholds – also average excess purchase premium of over a billion dollar for each 
TBTF merger deal.   
Column 2 of Table 5 presents the excess purchase premiums that the TBTF acquirers 
paid to acquire non-TBTF targets – Subsidy (Acquirer_Already_TBTF) – equation (4).  There 
are 30 merger deals for the top panel ($100 billion asset TBTF threshold) in this category.  As 
discussed earlier, the premiums in this case are mostly based on the size of the target, as larger 
targets provide greater opportunity for the TBTF acquirers to expand their deposit base.  The 
estimated total TBTF premiums range from about $20 billion (60-day window) to $29 billion (20-
day window) for the 30 merger deals.   
Column 3 of Table 5 presents the excess purchase premiums (discounts) that the TBTF 
acquirers paid to acquire another TBTF target – Subsidy (Acquirer & Target_Already_TBTF) – 
equation (5).  From Tables 2, 3, and 4, the excess premiums are mostly insignificantly different 
from zero, except for those related to the co-variation of the returns between the TBTF targets 
and the TBTF acquirers.  The results show a small net negative purchase premium for all the 
TBTF thresholds as reported in Table 5.   
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Our results provide some support for the claim that investors may be bidding up the price of targets in 
advance.  We find that the regressions that use 40- and 60-day windows for calculating bid premiums 
have greater explanatory power than those using just 20-day windows.   
  24  Overall, our results indicate that there may be significant benefits accrued to TBTF 
banking organizations.  It is important to point out that these estimated TBTF benefits do not 
include the benefits that have been captured by organizations, such as Bank America 
Corporation and Citigroup, which were already TBTF prior to our study period.  Therefore, the 
true value of potential TBTF benefits could be much larger than our estimate. 
 
V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications: 
Our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that large banking organizations 
obtain advantages not available to other organizations.  These advantages may include 
becoming TBTF and thus gaining favor with uninsured bank creditors and other market 
participants, operating with lower regulatory costs, and increasing the organization’s chances of 
receiving regulatory forbearance.  Other advantages could be associated with organizations 
becoming large enough to be “national players” and thus be in control of their own future rather 
than being acquisition targets themselves. 
We find that banking organizations are willing to pay an added premium for mergers that 
will put them over a TBTF threshold.  This added premium amounted to an estimated $14 to 
$16.5 billion extra that nine banking organizations (Table 5 Column 1) in our data set were 
willing to pay for acquisitions that enabled them to become TBTF (crossing the $100 billion 
threshold).  As mentioned earlier, since TBTF is not officially defined, there is no way to know 
with certainty what size of banking organization might be regarded as being TBTF.  We find that 
the TBTF banking organizations in our data set paid an estimated $20 to $29 billion of extra 
purchase premiums in total (in 30 acquisitions) to further expand their asset base and to obtain 
additional TBTF benefits after having crossed the TBTF threshold.   
While these amounts are large, they may underestimate the total value of the benefits 
that accrue to large banking organizations.  Organizations seeking to obtain TBTF benefits are 
not likely to be forced by the marketplace to pass on anywhere near the full value of these 
  25benefits to the shareholders of their acquisition targets.  In addition, these estimated benefits 
only apply to the organizations that became TBTF during our study period.  Benefits already 
obtained by banking organizations that became TBTF prior to our sample period thus would not 
be included in our TBTF benefit calculations.  As a result, the total value to large banks could 
easily be much higher than what we estimate. 
These estimates provide an aggregate measure of the benefits accruing to large banking 
organizations from exceeding a TBTF threshold and do not indicate the relative contribution of 
any particular regulatory advantage or individual policy.  By themselves, our results do not point 
out which particular policy directions would be most effective in addressing the benefits large 
banks may obtain once they become TBTF.  However, our estimates of the benefits from 
exceeding a TBTF threshold appear large enough to cause increasing concerns as the 
megamerger trend continues in the U.S. banking industry.  These trends could potentially hinder 
the efficient allocation of financial resources across different sizes of institutions, and, in turn, 
their customers and the overall macroeconomy.
12  Consequently, this is an important public 
policy issue that merits consideration for competitive balance between large and small banking 





                                                 
12  See Hoenig (1999) and Carow, Kane, and Narayanan (2006) for further discussion. 
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  28Table 1 




PREM_20               20 day purchase premium of a target bank ($ mill) -- computed as  
                                               purchase price less pre-consolidation market value. 
PREM_40                40 day purchase premium of a target bank ($ mill) 




D_Become_TBTF              Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target are both  
                                               not TBTF prior to the merger, but the combined banking firm will 
                                               become TBTF after the merger, and zero otherwise. 
 
D_Acquirer_TBTF              Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is already TBTF prior to 
                                               the merger but the target is not TBTF, and zero otherwise. 
 
D_Acquirer_TBTF * TA_TGT Interactive term of the variable D_Acquirer_TBTF and the target’s 
                                                total assets 
 
D_Both_TBTF               Indicator variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and the target are  
                                               already TBTF prior to the merger, and zero otherwise. 
  
D_Both_TBTF * TA_TGT      Interactive term of the indicator variable D_Both_TBTF and the  
                                               target’s total assets 
 
D_Both_TBTF * COV             Interactive term of the indicator variable D_Both_TBTF and the  
                                               covariance variable COV_TGT_ACQ 
 
Acquirer Characteristics 
VAR_ROA_ACQ    The variance (volatility) of ROA of the acquirer over the 13 quarters 
                  before the quarter of the merger announcement date. 
 
MKT_BOOK_ACQ                 The ratio of market value of common to the book value of common  
                                               in the quarter before the quarter of the merger announcement date.
 
BETA_ACQ                            The acquirer’s Beta (measure of systematic risk) calculated from  
                                                daily stock returns for the period beginning 300 days prior to the  
                                                merger, using the One-Factor Model 
 
GROWTH_ACQ                      Growth rate of total assets of the acquirer over the 13 quarters  
                                                before the quarter of the merger announcement date 
 
BV_CAP_ASSET_ACQ  Book value of capital-to-asset ratio of the acquirer in the quarter  
                                               prior to the announcement date 
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Target Characteristics 
 
VAR_ROA_TGT               The variance (volatility) of ROA of the target over the 13 quarters  
                                                before the quarter of the merger announcement date 
MKT_BOOK_TGT                 The ratio of market value of common to the book value of common 
                                                in the quarter before the quarter of the merger announcement date
 
BETA_TGT                             The target’s Beta (measure of systematic risk) calculated from  
                                                daily stock returns for the period beginning 300 days prior to the  
                                                merger, using the One-Factor Model. 
 
GROWTH_TGT                       Growth rate of total assets of the target over the 13 quarters  





COV_TGT_ACQ                Covariance of the ROA of the target and acquirer over the 13  
                                                quarters before the quarter of the merger announcement date 
 
REL_SIZE_TGT_ACQ           Ratio of target’s total assets to acquirer’s total assets 
 
Regional Binary Variables 
 
D_East                                    Indicator variable equal to total target assets in the East region if 
                                                target’s state is CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, RI, VT, or  
                                                PA, and zero otherwise. 
 
D_West                                   Indicator variable equal to total target assets in the West region if  
                                                target’s state is AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT,  
                                                WA, or WY, and zero otherwise. 
 
D_Southeast                           Indicator variable equal to total target assets in the Southeast if  
                                                the target’s state is AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, 
                                                or WV, and zero otherwise 
 
Other Deal Characteristics 
 
D_InState                Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the 
                                               same state, and zero otherwise. 
 
D_MOE                                  Indicator variable equal to 1 if it is a merger of equal 
 
D_1991, to D_2003                Indicator variable equal to 1 if the transaction occurred in the year 
                                               Specified -- from 1991 to 2003 (2004 is the base year). 
  30Table 2 
The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_20 
Using Three Different Definitions of “Too-Big-To-Fail” Thresholds 
 
 
The definition of the dependent and independent variables are summarized in the Table 1.  Sample 
Period: 1991-2005 (N=412).  The heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses.  The coefficients of year and regional indicators (control variables) are not reported in the 
table.  The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1% level, the 5% level, and the 10% level based on 






 > $100 Bill 
II 
Largest 11 Banks 
Total Assets 
III 
Market Value of 
Equity > $20 Bill 






TBTF Variables:   




































Target’s Characteristics:   
























  31Table 2 (Cont’d) 
The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_20 




Acquirer’s Characteristics:   






























Target-Acquirer Relation:   












Deal Characteristics:   



















  32Table 3 
The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_40 
Using Three Different Definitions of “Too-Big-To-Fail” Thresholds 
 
 
The definition of the dependent and independent variables are summarized in the Table 1.  Sample 
Period: 1991-2005 (N=412).  The heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses.  The coefficients of year and regional indicators (control variables) are not reported in the 
table.  The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1% level, the 5% level, and the 10% level, based on 






 > $100 Bill 
II 
Largest 11 Banks 
Total Assets 
III 
Market Value of 
Equity > $20 Bill 






TBTF Variables:   




































Target’s Characteristics:   
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The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_40 




Acquirer’s Characteristics:   






























Target-Acquirer Relation:   












Deal Characteristics:   














86.65% 87.81% 87.88% 
 
  34Table 4 
The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_60 
Using Three Different Definitions of “Too-Big-To-Fail” Thresholds 
 
 
The definition of the dependent and independent variables are summarized in the Table 1.  Sample 
Period: 1991-2005 (N=412).  The heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses.  The coefficients of year and regional indicators (control variables) are not reported in the 
table.  The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1% level, the 5% level, and the 10% level, based on 






 > $100 Bill 
II 
Largest 11 Banks 
Total Assets 
III 
Market Value of 
Equity > $20 Bill 






TBTF Variables:   




































Target’s Characteristics:   
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The Empirical Results – Dependent Variable is PREM_60 




Acquirer’s Characteristics:   






























Target-Acquirer Relation:   












Deal Characteristics:   


















  36Table 5 
Estimated Dollar Value ($ Million in year 2005) of TBTF Premiums 
Using Various TBTF Thresholds 
 
The estimated TBTF premiums are calculated based on equations (3), (4), and (5), using those 
coefficients that are significant at the 10% level or higher from the results presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  
The reported dollar values below are the combined TBTF premiums for all the merger deals in each 
category. 
 
  Acquirer & Target 
NOT TBTF, Combined 
Firm Becomes TBTF 




TBTF, Target Not 
TBTF but Becomes 
Part of TBTF Org. 
After the Merger 
Equation (4) 
Both Acquirer and 
Target Already 





$100 Billion Asset: 
60-Day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium  
TBTF Premium  
40-day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium 
TBTF Premium  
20-day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium  







































$20 Billion Mkt Cap: 
60-Day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium  
TBTF Premium  
40-day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium 
TBTF Premium  
20-day Premium: 







































Largest 11th Bank: 
60-Day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium  
TBTF Premium  
40-day Premium: 
Actual Total Premium 
TBTF Premium  
20-day Premium: 



































  37                                                                    Appendix I 
List of Acquirers and Target in Each Merger Type 
When Definition of TBTF is -- Total Assets Larger Than $1 Billion 
 
Case 1:  Acquirers Become TBTF After the Merger – 9 observations 










Chemical Banking Corp. 
NCNB Corp, Charlotte, NC 
First Union Corp, Charlotte, NC 
NBD Bancorp, Detroit, MI 
Wells Fargo & Co. 
Banc One Corp, Columbus, OH 
Washington Mutual Inc., Seattle 
Norwest Corp 
Firstar Corp, Milwaukee 
Manufacturers Hanover Corp. 
C&S/Sovran Corp. 
First Fidelity Bancorporation 
First Chicago Corp, Illinois 
First Interstate Bancorp 
Liberty Bancorp Inc, Oklahoma 
Ahmanson H.F. & Co., Irwindale, CA 
Wells Fargo 
U.S. Bancorp, Minneapolis 
 
Case 2:  Acquirers Are Already TBTF Prior to the Merger – 30 observations 
































Bank America Corp 
Bank America Corp  
NationsBank Corp 




First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp  
First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp 
First Union Corp 
First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp 
Banc One Corp 
First Union Corp 





Washington Mutual  
FleetBoston Financial Group 
First Union Corp 
Washington Mutual Inc. 
Citigroup  
Wells Fargo  
National City Corp  
SunTrust Banks Inc.  
Wachovia Corp 
Valley Capital Corp  
Security Pacific 
MNC Financial 
Continental Bank Corp 
RHNB Corp 
Intercontinental Bank 
Bank South Corp 
Home Financial Corp 
Charter Bancshares Inc  
Center Financial Corp 
Boatmen’s Bancshares Inc. 




CoreStates Financial Corp 
BankBoston  
First Security Corp 
First Commerce Bancshares 
First Security Corp 
Brenton Banks Inc 
Bank United Corp 
Summit Bancorp Princeton 
Wachovia Corp 
Dime Bancorp NY 
Golden State Bancorp  
Pacific Northwest Bancorp  
Provident Financial Group  
National Commerce Financial Corp 
SouthTrust Corp 
  38Case 3:   Both Acquirers and Targets are already TBTF Prior to the Merger 








Banc One Corp (Columbus, OH) 
NationsBank 
Chase Manhattan Corp 
BankAmerica 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
First Chicago NBD Corp 
BankAmerica Corp 
J.P. Morgan & Co 
FleetBoston Financial Corp 




Case 4:  Both Acquirers and Targets Are Not TBTF Prior to the Merger and Will Not Become 










Distribution of Merger Categories 




















Total Assets Larger 













Total Assets Larger 















Market Value of Equity 










Total Assets Larger 










Total Assets Larger 









  Note:  Total number of observations is 412.
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